This time frame, during which the revolutionary changes were taking place in Eastern Europe, coincides precisely with the period when analogous upheavals were taking place in the Soviet Union. It is apparent that the links between the given events were of a causal nature: After becoming aware of the principles of political renewal issuing from the USSR, the countries in question were able to contemplate various ways of resolving the issue of monopolistic communistic parties. In turn many of these options were adopted in the USSR. Ultimately all members of the "socialist commonwealth" in Europe underwent a process of transformation, even including the breakup of former federative systems contained within them.
occasion of the debate and approval of a resolution by the nineteenth party conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Perestroika ended with the breakup of the USSR in December of 1991. Within this period of history the fundamental revolutionary events in the European nations of the "socialist commonwealth" took place. The year of 1989 will be considered pivotal, representing the transitional stage within the dates cited. This time frame, during which the revolutionary changes were taking place in Eastern Europe, coincides precisely with the period when analogous upheavals were taking place in the Soviet Union, as it were-to borrow a metaphor-a smaller doll in a larger set of nesting (matryoshka) dolls.
Looking back it is clear that just as the processes of perestroika drove the revolutionary changes in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, at the same time these changes were having an influence on the character of the processes taking place in the birthplace of perestroika: namely, a situation of mutual conditionality. Hence the entire process of transition that was transpiring in the vast distance from Berlin to Vladivostok can be considered one of cause and effect (It should be noted that the Russian expression used here for cause and effect, or causality, is "reciprocity" (retsiproknost'), a term rarely applied in Russian historiography and almost never used in Russian politological science).
Therefore the concept of cause and effect is essential to more accurately determine the direction and fundamental nature of the factors-with the support of extant datainvolved in the revolutions referred to above throughout the nations of the "Eastern bloc" or of the "socialist commonwealth" (in Soviet parlance, part of the "international socialist system" to which, as is generally known, belonged nations of Asia and the Americas).
It is important to place the parameters of the causality in question in a historical context. Although it may be difficult to posit one universal unambiguous description of these factors, one can reasonably assume two key elements: removal of the monopoly of one party, or transformation (both as a process and as an end result) of governmental and state structures, whereby the most radical of these took place in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.
An important incentive for the upheavals in the socialist-communist European nations came with the resolution of the first congress of the people's deputies of the USSR on 25 May 1989. This congress largely represented a continuation of the policies formulated at the aforementioned nineteenth party conference one year earlier. It was at this congress in May that irrevocable reforms of the political system of the USSR were acknowledged to be inevitable. In the course of executing these reforms, institutional structures opposed to the status quo were formed, leading ultimately to the dismantling of the leadership of the USSR.
At about this time-beginning in spring of 1989-in the nations of the "socialist commonwealth" internal opposition within the governing party as in Hungary, as well as external opposition as in Poland was forming with the intention of grasping significant power in the governments of the time. At the same time the oppositional forces that were forming in the USSR were being influenced by the efforts of its neighbors.
What is more, a part of the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Unionmost notably its leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev-was in agreement with these reform movements, albeit unaware of the potential consequences.
Clearly, the countenance of these political reforms (the frigid Kremlin winds were rapidly subsiding) was ample evidence of a further sharp intensification of the activities of the oppositional forces in the socialist nations of Europe. Which, in turn, is renewed evidence of the causality of the dynamics involved in the evolving processes in all European nations of the "socialist commonwealth" and of the clear direction they "to institute an emergency revolutionary court to try the Ceauşescu spouses. And, in fact, as soon as the death sentence was executed on 25 December guns fell silent" [9] .
According to their own statement the United States declared that "they had no opposition to a military intervention on the part of the USSR to restore order in Romania" and to support pro-democracy forces in their struggle against troops loyal to Ceauşescu.
As for the USSR it adhered to its principal doctrine of not interfering in the affairs of a socialist nation [10] .
Finally, beginning in spring of 1990 communists suffered continuing losses at the polls in the republics of Yugoslavia, whereby here to a lesser extent there were similar waves of insurgency from north to south, from Slovenia and Croatia to Serbia and
Macedonia.
An analysis of the progress of events in all of these countries is replete with speculation and imponderables. Who of the residents of Prague was the first to draw a bunch of keys of his pocket and rattle them so loudly that his gesture caught the attention of more than 300,000 denizens of the city? Whose actions finally led to the shots in Bucharest? How was it possible to escape the seemingly inevitable bloody confrontations with law enforcement in Leipzig in October 1989 and in Berlin in November?
Looking from "below" reveals a similar succession of riddles. The view from "above" on the other hand only leads to more ambiguity. Both perspectives some twenty years down the road can yield insights only on the basis of a reciprocal view of the events, that is, when in a general sense the events are seen not only on the basis of protocols of the political parties, of the governments or of the opposition, but also by means of other sources of information such as videos or accounts of participant observation. All of these processes were accompanied by declarations of the international community of nations demanding or declining to acknowledge these states (including the declaration of independence by Kosovo in this century). Understanding the evolution of these five national entities is a daunting task. In appreciating the present situation it might be fitting to recall that there will always be forces for which it is useful to place one or more pots of boiling bullion on the burner of a stove in southern Europe only to spill it on the feet of neighbors near and far at the most inopportune moment [11] .
The independence of these and subsequent other states on the territory of Yugoslavia was generally sanctioned by practically all countries of Europe (including those where the opposite took place-the unification of the two Germanies on 3
October 1990-on the basis of appeals to ethnic consolidation).
The algorithms of the breakup of these socialistic federations took on the following pattern: The emergence and the rapid escalation of ethnic movements-developing within ruling parties with a nationalist tendency-focused on their "own" federal republics and the formation of a union or federation. The progression of events made it apparent that what at first seemed secondary (a postulate of "all or nothing" of the cultural autonomy of ethnic groups in Yugoslavia, of demagogical claims to inflated "investments" in this or the other federal republic, just as it was with similar conflicts in the USSR-not to the mention the "battle of the hyphen" in Czecho-Slovakia) emerged as a first priority in the context of the rapidly spreading turmoil.
The next stage of events in the posited algorithm took place in the USSR, whereby the application of the concept of causality, of cause and effect, is obvious. In truth, the experience of Yugoslavia in whatever form, direct or indirect, has become selfevident-and it was characterized by bloody military conflicts, ethnic cleansing, efforts to erect totalitarian regimes and the creation of unrecognized republics.
This phenomenon was taken into account with the aim of avoiding bloody conflicts on the territory of the former USSR-an aim that was not reached entirely. In many ways these conflicts were akin to a smoldering peat bog: Flames are not visible on the surface but sudden flashes appear unpredictably at completely different places. If an attempt is made to formulate two parameters of the causality referenced at the outset of these remarks the following picture emerges: In north-central Europe revolutionary processes usually took place against a backdrop of negotiations avoiding bloodshed. In the southern parts of the region it was necessary to resort to great force to achieve overthrow of a government. In the course of the sweeping changes in the USSR the picture was similar: During the course of reform processes, negotiations were more actively pursued in the north than in the south.
There used to be a popularly held notion of wave of stability on the European continent [12] . In Central Europe this notion prevailed from the end of the 1980s in many analyses just as it had in Western Europe. The course of revolutionary changes in Central Europe and their consequences tells us that this approach to understanding events also holds for Eastern Europe-where former republics of the USSR are located.
In applying the concept of causality the question arises: Can the principle of such waves of stability be applied to the countries of Eastern Europe? An unambiguous answer will have to be based on a series of complex phenomena, especially if one considers that since the nations of the Baltic have become members of NATO and the EU they are now part of Central Europe.
For instance, the stability of Belarus is provided by a structure not considered to be democratic. Nevertheless the arrangement is accepted by a large majority of Belorussians and is even acceptable to a majority of citizens of Russia.
Ukraine in this context has by any measure an extremely unstable government for two reasons: a declared intention to generate a superficial image of democracy competing with fierce internal struggles for public ownership. Vladivostok-or even from Vancouver to Vladivostok. The expressions of hope such as the vision of a "Common European Home" turned out in many ways to be utopian, but they have not been dispelled to this day. The ideas therefore that this twenty-year period of history has engendered have not lost their attractiveness. Moreover, the appeal to return to the basic tenants of socialist reform take on new meaning as the world searches for a means to mobilize resources of all nations in mastering the crises which are affecting the whole world. It is likely that such aspirations will reflect the principle of cause and effect as is already being evidenced by thinkers searching for new solutions.
In conclusion, the way of thinking that has emerged from the study of the political events in the USSR and the rest of the countries considered here from at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s deserves primary attention: The interaction between these events was causal, that is, one event was usually the consequence of the other. Once the political winds of reform blowing in the USSR were felt, the countries under discussion began to contemplate possible solutions to the problem of single-party authority. In turn, these political trends carried over to the USSR where over time they assumed commonly shared features.
The final result was a transformation of all European members of the so-called "socialist commonwealth." Paradoxically these former socialist entities at least pro forma returned to the fold of nations in the Central European area-in contrast to the countries of Eastern Europe, especially Russia. This, however, is already a topic for still another discourse. Whereby such a discourse will most certainly require the principles of causality set forth here.
This has been an attempt to provide an answer to a two-part question: Did Soviet perestroika stir revolutionary tendencies in the nations of the "Eastern bloc" in the years 1989 and 1990 and to what extent did the intensity of these tendencies lead to the ultimate consequences of perestroika in the USSR? It is apparent that the links between the given events were of a causal nature: After becoming aware of the principles of political renewal issuing from the USSR, the countries in question were able to contemplate various ways of resolving the issue of monopolistic communistic parties.
In turn many of these options were adopted in the USSR. Ultimately all members of the "socialist commonwealth" in Europe underwent a process of transformation, even including the breakup of former federative systems contained within them.
